

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Chile

Article I

Chile considers the implementation of article I to be essential and imperative in order to halt the proliferation of such weapons of mass destruction. The threat of nuclear terrorism confirms the need to ensure that nuclear weapons are not transferred.

Article II

As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Chile reiterates its firm commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In keeping with articles I and II, our country is a State party to all the regional and universal instruments prohibiting nuclear arms and their proliferation, including the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Chile has traditionally promoted and will continue to promote this objective in all forums and regimes for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, including the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Article III

As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Chile has agreed to accept the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Our country is a State party to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with IAEA and its Additional Protocol. Chile strongly supports the Agency's global verification regime. Chile does not have any reactors that produce nuclear power, but it does have research reactors that are subject to IAEA safeguard measures. Consequently, all dual-use material is subject to the Agency's safeguard measures.



Article IV

Chile supports the inalienable right of all Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Chile considers that, in exercising this right, special care must be taken to maintain the security of nuclear facilities, material and technology. In that connection, Chile appreciates the initiative of the President of the United States of America to convene a nuclear security summit.

Our country is particularly concerned about the safe transport of radioactive waste and materials. As a coastal State, Chile considers it necessary to receive early notification about this form of cargo and about the liability conventions that cover this type of transport in the event of an accident.

Article V

As indicated earlier, Chile is a State party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This instrument, in our opinion, represents the international community's desire to prohibit nuclear tests for all time. The Treaty is making a unique contribution to curbing the arms race.

The current international monitoring system makes it possible to monitor this type of activity properly on a global scale. The system contributes significantly to international non-proliferation and security. Chile participates in the system through seven stations located in its mainland territory and on offshore islands, and is prepared to assume responsibilities in Antarctica using station S154. We also appreciate the fact that the technology used by the monitoring system can be applied to the analysis of natural phenomena in order to prevent natural disasters caused by seismic or volcanic activity or tsunamis.

Article VI

As stated earlier, Chile promotes nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in every appropriate forum.

We strongly supported General Assembly resolution 58/51 on this subject and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of using nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, our country supports those programmes that promote nuclear disarmament, negative security measures and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In that connection, it should be noted that Chile coordinated the work of the Conference on Disarmament at its 2008 and 2009 sessions with respect to agenda item 1, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and has consistently favoured an early start to negotiations for a ban on the production of fissionable materials for hostile purposes; in the First Committee of the General Assembly, together with a group of countries from Africa, Asia and Europe, it led the initiative on "decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems"; last year (2009), it became the coordinator of focal points of States parties to the instruments that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, and this year, in that capacity,

it will convene the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones on 30 April, just prior to the Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Chile supports the United Nations Secretary-General's five-point plan for nuclear disarmament.

Article VII

Chile is firmly committed to the objectives and purposes of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing the denuclearization of Latin America and the Caribbean, and we promote the expansion of the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty. We are convinced that nuclear-weapon-free zones play a fundamental role in achieving the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by ensuring peace and stability in the regions concerned. They constitute an effective measure for both disarmament and non-proliferation.

In view of the foregoing, and as indicated earlier, we are currently involved in organizing the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. The goal of the Conference will be to increase collaboration between the different zones; to encourage nuclear-weapon States to fully respect the zones, including through the ratification of the relevant protocols; and to support the establishment of new zones, including the establishment in the near future of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Article VIII

Chile participates regularly in the review conferences on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and will certainly attend the Eighth Review Conference, cooperating in the proper conduct of its work and the preservation and development of this fundamental instrument for disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Article IX

Chile hopes that India, Israel and Pakistan will accede to the Treaty, and that the People's Democratic Republic of Korea will return to it, as non-nuclear States.

Article X

Chile considers that the right to withdraw from the Treaty should be exercised in a manner that does not involve a departure from its principles and objectives, particularly as set out in paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009).

We maintain our position that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not entail the indefinite possession of nuclear arms.

Chile firmly supports the 13 practical steps adopted at the Sixth Review Conference (2000), which constitute a systematic and progressive effort to achieve the implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Austria

Article I

1. Austria regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Compliance with the undertaking by nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty under article I is therefore of primary importance.

Article II

2. Austria continues to abide by its undertaking not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This commitment is implemented through corresponding laws and regulations and has been enshrined in the constitutional law on a nuclear-free Austria since 1999.

Article III

Safeguards

3. Before Austria's accession to the European Union (EU), the requirement of article III, paragraph 1 was fulfilled by the safeguards agreement of 1972 between Austria and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Upon accession to the EU in 1995, the safeguards agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the EU non-nuclear-weapon States and IAEA entered into force for Austria and the 1972 safeguards agreement was suspended.

4. Austria has always been, at all times, actively engaged in the process of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, to which it attaches utmost importance.



5. With regard to the Additional Protocol between EURATOM, the EU non-nuclear-weapon States and IAEA signed in September 1998, Austria concluded all necessary steps at the national level for its entry into force in 2001. The Additional Protocols for the EU member States entered into force simultaneously on 30 April 2004.

6. Starting with the safeguards implementation report for 2006, the IAEA secretariat has consistently concluded that in the case of Austria, all nuclear material continues to be used for peaceful purposes. Austria has implemented a State-level integrated safeguards approach since the beginning of 2008, which has led to a reduction in the frequency and activities of safeguards inspections.

7. Austria considers the Additional Protocol to be an integral part of the IAEA NPT safeguards system and holds the legal position that the conclusion of an additional protocol is mandatory under article III of the Treaty.

Export controls

8. Austria implements its obligation under article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, namely not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article, by controlling its exports in accordance with EU Council regulation 428/2009.

9. Austria is a member of both the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. From 1993 to 2005, the Zangger Committee was chaired by Fritz W. Schmidt of Austria. Under his chairmanship, the Committee launched an outreach programme and a website (www.zanggercommittee.org) to enhance transparency and foster dialogue with non-members.

10. In Austria's view, an effective export control system facilitates cooperation for peaceful purposes in the nuclear field.

Physical protection

11. Austria attaches great importance to a high level of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. It actively participated in the Open-ended Group of Legal and Technical Experts convened by the Director General of IAEA to prepare a well-defined amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In September 2003, the Austrian Foreign Minister took the initiative of submitting an amendment proposal based on the outcome of the Group of Experts to the IAEA Director General with a request to convene a diplomatic conference for its adoption. This amendment proposal was submitted to the IAEA Director General by Austria on behalf of 24 States parties in May 2004. Austria subsequently played a leading role in the consultations to convince the required half of all States Parties to the Convention to support the convening of a diplomatic conference, which finally took place from 4 to 8 July 2005. The diplomatic conference adopted the amendment to the Convention by consensus and Austria ratified the amendment on 18 September 2006. As at 1 February 2010, IAEA records showed that the amendment had 33 contracting States.

12. In Austria's view, physical protection is an integral part of the national nuclear security system that must be required as a condition for nuclear supplies.

Article IV

13. Following a referendum in 1978, Austria renounced the use of nuclear fission for power generation and does not operate nuclear power plants. In view of the high risks emanating from nuclear installations, Austria attaches utmost importance to international efforts to harmonize and steadily increase all aspects of nuclear safety and security. Austria is party to both the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and has actively participated in the review meetings of those Conventions. Austria is also party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the amendment thereto.

14. Regarding the undertakings in article IV, paragraph 2, Austria is an active member of IAEA, collaborating on research and offering training opportunities in nuclear science and technology. Austria has consistently paid its full target share to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and has cooperated on IAEA projects in developing countries. As a member of the European Union, Austria also contributes to a range of IAEA activities under EU joint actions.

Article V

15. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirms that the provisions of Article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Austria signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996, when it was opened for signature and deposited its instrument of ratification on 13 March 1998. From 2007 to 2009, Austria held the co-chairmanship, with Costa Rica, of the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT. In that function, Austria organized and supported outreach activities, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean, which led to further signatures and ratifications of the Treaty. Austria fully supports the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its Provisional Technical Secretariat and attaches particular importance to the swift establishment of the Treaty's international verification system. Austria has one radionuclide laboratory (ATL03) at the Austrian Institute of Technology at Seibersdorf, which was certified as the first of 16 radionuclide laboratories worldwide in November 2001.

Article VI

16. Austria's objective has been, and remains, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Consequently, Austria continues to call upon all nuclear-weapon States to comply fully with their obligations under article VI. Austria accords high priority to the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. While acknowledging and welcoming progress in the reduction of nuclear weapons, Austria urges nuclear-weapon States to fully implement all 13 practical steps, which serve as an important yardstick for measuring progress in the fulfilment of article VI.

17. In view of the obligations of all NPT parties to strive for general and complete disarmament, Austria is also a State party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty, and spares no efforts to fully implement them. Austria ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 2 April 2009, as the sixth Contracting Party, and looks forward to its entry into force on 1 August 2010.

18. In 2009, Austria was among the six States chairing the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which agreed to include negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in its programme of work. Furthermore, Austria contributes to general disarmament efforts through its function as Immediate Central Contact for the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and its participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Article VII

19. Austria welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally agreed criteria.

Article VIII

20. The indefinite extension of the NPT and accompanying decisions in 1995 included a commitment to a strengthened review process. In that regard, Austria attaches particular importance to enhancing the performance of and accountability under the Treaty, in particular by submitting reports on the implementation of the Treaty to meetings of the Preparatory Committee and to Review Conferences.

Article IX

21. Austria attaches high importance to the universalization of the Treaty and continues to urge India, Israel and Pakistan to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with article IX.

Article X

22. Austria deplored the announcement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 10 January 2003, of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Austria continues to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its decision and to comply fully with all nuclear non-proliferation norms, in particular with its obligations under the NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA, and to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.
